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Abstract
The notion of (k,m)-agreeable society was introduced by Deborah Berg et al.:a family of convex
subsets of Rd is called (k,m)-agreeable if any subfamily of size m contains at least one non-empty k-fold
intersection. In that paper, the (k,m)-agreeability of a convex family was shown to imply the existence
of a subfamily of size βn with non-empty intersection, where n is the size of the original family and
β ∈ [0, 1] is an explicit constant depending only on k,m and d. The quantity β(k,m, d) is called the
minimal agreement proportion for a (k,m)-agreeable family in Rd.
If we only assume that the sets are convex, simple examples show that β = 0 for (k,m)-agreeable
families in Rd where k < d. In this paper, we introduce new techniques to find positive lower bounds
when restricting our attention to families of d-boxes, i.e. cuboids with sides parallel to the coordinates
hyperplanes. We derive explicit formulas for the first non-trivial case: the case of (2, 3)-agreeable families
of d-boxes with d ≥ 2.
1 Introduction
The article [2] introduced the concept of geometric approval voting, where a platform is a point in Rd and
a vote can be any convex subset, representing all the platforms deemed acceptable by that particular voter.
(The convexity assumption is a way to require our voters to be reasonable: the fact that all votes contain
every point on a segment with both endpoints in the vote means that any platform obtained as a compromise
between two acceptable positions is again deemed acceptable.) The main question addressed in [2] was, given
a collection of votes, to find the largest number of overlapping votes, and thus the largest number of voters
that could be satisfied by the adoption of any single platform.
More specifically, the authors concentrated on what they termed (k,m)-agreeable societies, where any
group of m voters contains k or more who can agree on a common platform. Their main goal was to obtain
lower bounds on the agreement proportion (the ratio number of satisfied voters over total number of voters)
in terms of k,m and d only. Using the version of the fractional Helly theorem due to Kalai [7], they showed
that if the society contains n ≥ m votes, all of which are convex subsets of Rd, then there exsits a platform
contained in at least β(k,m, d) n votes, where the proportion β(k,m, d) verifies:
β(k,m, d) ≥ 1−
[
1−
(
k
d+1
)(
m
d+1
)] 1d+1 . (1)
Given that the fractional Helly theorem cannot use information on the number of k-fold intersection when
k ≤ d, it is no surprise that this lower bound is positive only when k ≥ d+ 1.
If the general convex case requires detailed information about the whole nerve complex of the arrangement
of votes, the intersection graph does capture the complexity of the whole arrangement in the special case
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when the votes are boxes, i.e. parallelotopes whose sides are parallel to the coordinate axes. This case
was also addressed in [2], and purely graph-theoretic considerations yielded a sharp bound of k/m for the
agreement proportion in the strong agreement case: the situation of (k,m)-agreeability where m ≤ 2k − 2.
(The result proved in [2] for this case m ≤ 2k − 2 is in fact substantially stronger: if the number of boxes
is n, there is an overlap of at least n−m+ k boxes, so the actual agreement proportion starts at k/m and
increases to 1 with the number n of boxes.)
The case of societies of (2,m)-agreeable d-boxes does not fall in the strong agreement category, and it
is left essentially open in [2]. In fact, it is not even clear at the outset that there is a positive agreement
proportion for (2,m)-agreeable d-box arrangements when m ≥ 3 and d ≥ 2, since the lower bound given
by (1) is zero in that case. In this paper, we tackle the (2, 3)-agreeable case and we prove the following
result.
Theorem 1.1 For any d ≥ 1, any (2, 3)-agreeable d-box society has an agreement proportion of at least
(2d)−1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Linear Case. The material in Section 2 is independent from the rest of the paper: it presents an elementary
proof of the fact that (2, 3)-agreeable arrangements of interval have agreement proportion 1/2.
Preliminaries. Section 3 introduces basic notations and definitions regarding arrangements of boxes and
their intersection graphs.
Degree Bounds. Section 4 establishes lower- and upper-bounds on the degrees of vertices of (2, 3)-agreeable
graphs with bounded clique number. A classification of the small cases is given, and we prove that
positive lower bounds do exist for all d.
Main Result. In Section 5, we establish the specific values of the lower bound stated in Theorem 1.1. The
proof uses a lower bound on boxicity taken from Adiga et al. [1]. Section 6 presents a few questions
left open by our work.
Appendix. We finish the paper with an entirely different lower bound proof. The bounds obtained are
somewhat weaker, but we believe that the technique, borrowing important ideas about arrangement
of boxes from Eckhoff’s work [5], is interesting in its own right in view of its applicability in other
settings.
Throughout the paper, all arrangements of boxes are assumed to be (2, 3)-agreeable. Many of the definitions
and results could easily be extended to the (k,m)-agreeable case; this level of generality was eschewed in order
to keep notations simple and legible. The only step for which (2, 3)-agreeability is crucial is in establishing
the lower bound of Section 4.
Acknowledgments. This paper originated with a research project that took place during the 2008 Under-
graduate Research Summer Institute at Vassar College, where the first two authors were students and the
last author was a visiting professor. The authors are grateful to the institute for its support, and extend
special thanks to Professor Frank and her own URSI group for helping to foster a stimulating mathematical
environment.
The software Mathematica, and especially the Combinatorica package, proved invaluable in the study of
examples for this paper.
Notation 1.2 Throughout this paper, G denotes a simple, undirected graph. The sets V (G) and E(G) are
respectively the sets of vertices and edges of G, and we let n = #V (G). Recall that any subset W of V (G)
gives rise to the subgraph G[W ] induced by W , which is the graph which has W as its set of vertices, and
has for edges all the edges of E(G) with both endpoints in W .
A clique in G is any subset of V (G) that induces a complete subgraph, and the size of the largest clique
is called the clique number of G and denoted by ω(G).
2
2 The Linear Case
The intersection graphs associated to arrangements of intervals in the line are perfect graphs. This allowed the
authors of [2] to prove the non-trivial fact: for any (k,m)-agreeable arrangement of intervals, the agreement
number is at least (n − R)/Q, where Q and R denote respectively the quotient and the remainder of the
euclidean division of m − 1 by k − 1. This lower bound is sharp, and it implies that any (k,m)-agreeable
collection of intervals must have an agreement proportion
β(k,m, 1) ≥ k − 1
m− 1 .
In particular, the above implies that any (2, 3)-agreeable collection of intervals has agreement proportion at
least 1/2. This substantially improves the general case bound given in the formula (1), which for d = 1 in
the (2, 3)-agreeable setting yields an agreement proportion of
1−
√
2
3
≈ 0.1835.
We reprove the bound of 1/2 using only elementary means. First, we need to know when the agreement
proportion equals 1.
Lemma 2.1 A linear society has agreement proportion 1 if and only if every pair of votes intersects. In the
terminology of [2], such an arrangement is called super-agreeable.
Proof. This is a special case of Helly’s theorem [8], which states that for any arrangement of convex sets
in Rd, the sets have a non-empty intersection if and only if all (d+ 1)-fold intersections are non-empty. ✷
Theorem 2.2 ([2, Theorem 1]) The agreement proportion of a linear (2, 3)-agreeable society is 1/2.
Proof. If every pair of votes intersects, Helly’s theorem for intervals implies that the agreement proportion
is 1. So, without loss of generality, we can assume that in our one-dimensional (2, 3)-agreeable society, there
are two non-intersecting intervals A (Alice’s vote) and B (Bob’s vote), with A to the left of B.
The remaining voters can be divided into three categories: those who only agree with Alice, those who
only agree with Bob, and those who can agree with both Alice and Bob. (There are no voters who agree with
neither since that would violate (2, 3)-agreeability.) These three categories of voters – call them friends of
Alice, friends of Bob and friends of both – form super-agreeable groups, where all voters can agree pairwise
and thus, by Helly’s theorem, all the votes in each group overlap. Indeed, friends of Alice must agree with
each other, because if two of them did not agree, then taken together with Bob, we would have three votes
containing no intersecting pair, violating the condition of (2, 3)-agreeability. Similarly, voters who only agree
with Bob must also agree with each other. As for votes which overlap with both Alice and Bob’s vote, they
all meet in the interval [max(A),min(B)] between A and B (Figure 1). If one of the three categories is
empty, we have two super-agreeable groups, one of which must account for at least one half of the voters,
and the result holds.
Suppose all three categories are non empty, and let C be a vote containing [max(A),min(B)], D be a vote
intersecting A only and E be a vote intersecting B only. The three votes must share at least one intersection
to respect the (2, 3)-agreeable condition; and note that if D ∩ E 6= ∅, it implies that the two intersctions
with C are also non-empty (all meet in the middle region). If we can find a vote D from a friend of Alice
such that C ∩ D = ∅, then we must have C ∩ E 6= ∅, and, replacing E by any other vote E′ intersecting
B, the same reasoning shows that C ∩ E′ 6= ∅ too. Thus any vote C bridging the gap between Alice and
Bob must either meet all the votes that intersect A or all the votes that intersect B. Thus, we can assign
those bridging votes to Alice or Bob, since they have to overlap with all of the friends of at least one. We
can divide the votes into two super-agreeable groups once again. One of those must account for at least half
the voters, proving the result. ✷
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Remark 2.3 This theorem is sharp: any society formed by taking r copies of A and r copies of B is
(2, 3)-agreeable with agreement proportion 1/2.
A B
CD
E
Figure 1: Alice, Bob, and their friends. The shaded area in the middle is shared by all the friends of Bob
and Alice, such as C.
Remark 2.4 The result of the previous theorem only holds in dimension 1. For instance, Figure 2 shows
five votes in dimension 2 arising from (2, 3)-agreeable voters, yet the agreement proportion is only 2/5.
Figure 2: A (2, 3)-agreeable society of 2-boxes with agreement proportion 2/5.
3 Boxes and Agreeable Graphs
We introduce some definitions and notations for the two main objects of study: arrangements of boxes and
their associated intersection graphs.
3.1 Arrangements of Boxes and Intersection Graphs
A d-box is a subset of Rd given by the cartesian product of d closed intervals. A collection B of boxes gives
rise to a graph in the following fashion.
Definition 3.1 The intersection graph GB associated to an arrangement B = {B1, . . . , Bn} of d-boxes is
the graph with vertices V = {1, . . . , n} and such that {i, j} is an edge if and only if Bi ∩Bj 6= ∅.
Conversely, given a simple undirected graph G, we can define its boxicity box(G): it is the smallest
integer d such that there exists an arrangement of d-boxes B whose intersection graph is G.
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Roberts [10] showed that this number is always finite, and that box(G) ≤ ⌊#V/2⌋. (Graphs for which this
bound is tight are classified in [11].)
Remark 3.2 By convention, we let box(Kn) = 0 for all n (a 0-box would be a point). This shows that
boxicity does not behave nicely with respect to taking subgraphs. On the other hand, it is clear that boxicity
can only decrease when taking induced subgraphs, since for any arrangement of d-boxes B = {B1, . . . , Bn}
and any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the intersection graph of the sub-arrangement {Bi | i ∈ I} is simply the graph
GB[I] induced by the vertices I in GB.
Example 3.3 Note that the bound box(G) ≤ ⌊#V/2⌋ remains sharp, even if we restrict our attention to
(2, 3)-agreeable graphs. Indeed, for any d ≥ 1, let Kd(2) be the complete d-partite graph on d pairs of
vertices, i.e. the graph with V = {1, 2, . . . , 2d} and where E contains all possible edges except those of the
form {i, i+1} for i odd (see Figure 3). The graph Kd(2) is (2, 3)-agreeable, and by [10, Theorem 7], we have
box(Kd(2)) = d = #V/2.
Remark 3.4 Graphs with box(G) ≤ 1 are interval graphs, which can be easily identified in linear time [3,6].
Algorithms exist to test if box(G) ≤ 2 [9], or to compute boxicity in general [4], but they are a lot more
cumbersome. The task of testing if box(G) ≤ d is known to be NP-complete for all d ≥ 2 [4].
1
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Figure 3: The complete partite graphs K3(2) and K4(2).
The definition of (2, 3)-agreeability as it appears in [2] can be reformulated in terms of intersection graphs.
Definition 3.5 An arrangement B = {B1, . . . , Bn} of d-boxes is (2, 3)-agreeable if and only if any one of
the three equivalent properties holds:
1. For any 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n, one at least of the intersections Bi∩Bj , Bi∩Bk or Bj ∩Bk is non-empty.
2. For any three vertices in the intersection graph GB, the graph induced by these vertices contains at
least one edge.
3. The graph complement GB of the intersection graph verifies ω(GB) ≤ 2.
3.2 Agreement Number and Agreement Proportion
Since any simple, undirected graph can be realized as the intersection graph of an arrangement of boxes, it
will be convenient to blur the distinction between the two notions. In particular, we can use properties (2)
and (3) in Definition 3.5 to define (2, 3)-agreeability for graphs rather than arrangement.
Another good reason to identify arrangements and their graphs is that the intersection graph encodes
all the information about arrangements of boxes (this fails for arrangements of more general convex sets).
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Indeed, in such an arrangement, having nonempty pairwise intersection and having a point common to all
the boxes are equivalent. In particular, the maximal number of overlapping boxes (or agreement number of
the society) is simply the clique number ω(GB) of the intersection graph.
Notation 3.6 We denote by G the set of all (2, 3)-agreeable graphs, and, for any d ≥ 0, denote by Gd the
subset of those graphs with boxicity at most d. Given r ≥ 1, we let G(r) and Gd(r) respectively be the subsets
of G and Gd formed by graphs G with ω(G) ≤ r. Note that for any G ∈ Gd(r) and any subset of vertices
W ⊆ V (G), the subgraph G[W ] induced by W is also in Gd(r): (2, 3)-agreeability is preserved by taking
induced graphs, and both clique size and boxicty can only decrease (Remark 3.2).
We define the associated vertex sizes for all r ≥ 1 and all d ≥ 0,
η(r, d) = max{#V (G) | G ∈ Gd(r)};
η(r) = max{#V (G) | G ∈ G(r)}.
These quantities are related by the inequalities
2r = η(r, 1) ≤ η(r, 2) ≤ · · · ≤ η(r).
We will show in Proposition 4.5 that η(r) is finite for all r ≥ 1, and thus that all sets Gd(r) are finite too.
This is not a surprising result, since it is the expected behavior brought on by (k,m)-agreeability; but note
that, in our case of interest, the very existence of a positive agreement proportion was left open in [2].
For any graph, the agreement proportion is defined as ω(G)/#V (G). Once we prove that the set Gd(r) is
finite for all r ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1, we can define
ρ(r, d) = min {ω(G)/#V (G) | G ∈ Gd(r)} , (2)
i.e. the minimal agreement proportion that can be obtained from a (2, 3)-agreeable graph with boxicity at
most d and clique number at most r.
4 Upper and Lower Bounds on Degrees
Throughout this section, G = (V,E) denotes a (2, 3)-agreeable graph on n vertices. We show that a (2, 3)-
agreeable graph with low clique number must have many edges. The results obtained here are purely
combinatorial: in this section, we ignore the geometry of the problem and the boxicity of G.
4.1 Lower Bound on the Degree
The following trivial observation is the key to establishing lower bounds on the degrees of vertices.
Lemma 4.1 If G is a (2, 3)-agreeable graph, then for any vertex v ∈ V , we have deg(v) ≥ n− ω(G)− 1.
Note that the inequality in this lemma may be strict, even if v is of minimal degree. We can see this by
considering G =W4, the wheel with four spokes, which is a (2, 3)-agreeable graph with n = 5 and ω(G) = 3.
Proof. The vertex v ∈ V is connected to deg(v) vertices. The remaining n − deg(v) − 1 vertices must
form a clique W . Indeed, if W was not a clique, it would contain two non-adjacent vertices, u and w. The
subgraph induced by the three vertices {u, v, w} would be empty, which would contradict the fact that G is
(2, 3)-agreeable. Thus, ω(G) ≥ |W | = n− deg(v) − 1, and the result follows. ✷
Using the formula
|E| = 1
2
∑
v∈V
deg(v),
Lemma 4.1 yields the following lower-bound on |E|.
6
12
3 4
5
Figure 4: The wheel with four spokes W4 is an example of a graph for which the inequality in Lemma 4.1 is
strict.
Corollary 4.2 For any (2, 3)-agreeable graph G, we have
|E| ≥ n
2
(n− ω(G)− 1).
The 5-cycle from Remark 2.4 verifies n = 5, ω(G) = 2 and |E| = 5. This shows that the bound in
Corollary 4.2 is sharp.
4.2 Examples with Low Agreement Proportion
The conclusion of [2] mentioned the existence of (2, 3)-agreeable families of 2-boxes with agreement 3/8.
(The example, credited to Rajneesh Hegde, was not given in the paper.) We give a few examples.
Case n = 8, box(G) = 2. Figures 5 and 6 give two non-isomorphic examples of families of eight 2-boxes with
no more than triple intersections. The corresponding intersection graphs have respectively 8 and 10
triangles.
Case n = 8, box(G) =? Figure 7 presents a third example of a (2, 3)-agreeable graph with agreement pro-
portion 3/8, obtained from Figure 5 by adding two edges. This graph has 12 triangles; its boxicity
may be more than 2 (we conjecture that it is).
Case n = 13, ω(G) = 4. Figure 8 presents (the complement of) a (2, 3)-agreeable graph on 13 vertices with
unknown boxicity and agreement proportion 4/13 ≈ 0.31. There are 39 distinct cliques of size 4 in
that example. We will prove in Proposition 4.4 that no (2, 3)-agreeable graph on 14 or more vertices
has such low clique number.
4.3 Upper Bounds on Degree and Graph Size
We now give upper-bounds on the degrees of vertices in (2, 3)-agreeable graphs, and deduce an upper bound
on the number of vertices of such a graph with given clique number.
Lemma 4.3 Let G ∈ Gd(r), where r ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1. Then for any v ∈ V , we have
deg(v) ≤ η(r − 1, d) ≤ η(r − 1).
Proof. The neighbors of v induce a (2, 3)-agreeable graph H . If there are more than η(r− 1, d) vertices in
the graph H , it must contain an r-clique, which together with v forms an (r + 1)-clique in G, contradicting
the hypothesis ω(G) ≤ r. ✷
7
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Figure 5: A (2, 3)-agreeable graph with |V (G)| = 8, ω(G) = 3 and box(G) = 2, together with a family of
2-boxes whose intersection graph is G. This graph is 4-regular, |E| = 16.
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8
Figure 6: Another (2, 3)-agreeable graph with |V (G)| = 8, ω(G) = 3 and box(G) = 2. Like the example
from Figure 5, t his graph also has boxicity 2, but |E| = 17.
8
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Figure 7: A (2, 3)-agreeable graph with |V (G)| = 8, ω(G) = 3, but box(G) unknown. Modifying the
arrangement of Figure 5 to have B1 ∩ B2 6= ∅ and B6 ∩ B7 6= ∅ creates more intersections, so it is not
immediately obvious whether a 2-box arrangement can realize this graph.
1 2
3 4
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13
Figure 8: The complement of this graph is a (2, 3)-agreeable 8-regular graph with ω = 4.
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The inequality in the lemma can be sharp, but it is not always so, even if G has the maximum η(r)
vertices: taking r = 3, we’ll see in Proposition 4.4 that η(r − 1) = 5 and η(r) = 8. The graphs in Figure 5
and in Figure 6 both have the maximum 8 vertices for their clique number of 3, but the maximum degree
is 4 in the first graph, but a sharp 5 in the second example.
With Lemma 4.1 giving a lower bound on the number of edges which increases with the number of
vertices, and Lemma 4.3 giving an upper-bound which depends only on the clique number, this suggests that
the graphs which maximize η(r) must be regular or almost-regular. We can use this idea to, step by step,
establish the first few values of η(r).
Proposition 4.4 We have the following table for the maximal size of (2, 3)-agreeable graphs with ω(G) = r.
r 1 2 3 4 5
η(r) 2 5 8 13 ≤ 18
Proof. By definition of (2, 3)-agreeability, any graph with at least three vertices must have an edge, and
thus η(1) = 2. The examples we’ve seen so far give the following lower bounds:
η(2) ≥ 5, η(3) ≥ 8, η(4) ≥ 13.
Suppose that these lower bounds are not sharp: i.e. there exists (2, 3)-agreeable graphs with the following.
#V 2 3 4 5
ω(G) 6 9 14 19
Let δ(G) and ∆(G) denote respectively the minimum and the maximum degree for vertices in G. The case
|V (G)| = 6 and ω(G) = 2 is clearly impossible, since Lemma 4.1 implies δ(G) ≥ 3, and Lemma 4.3 implies
∆(G) ≤ η(1) = 2, giving the contradiction δ(G) > ∆(G).
Thus, we have proved that η(2) = 5, which, combined with Lemma 4.3 implies that for any G ∈ G with
ω(G) = 3, we must have ∆(G) ≤ 5. In the case |V (G)| = 9 with ω(G) = 3, Lemma 4.1 yields δ(G) ≥ 5.
Since the graph G cannot be 5-regular (the sum of all degrees must be even), this yields in turn ∆(G) ≥ 6
which is again a contradiction.
This proves η(3) = 8, which implies that ∆(G) ≤ 8 for any G ∈ G with ω(G) = 4. The other cases are
similar. ✷
The method used in the proof of the above proposition could be extended indefinitely, provided one can
construct examples that provide lower bounds on η. Even without a battery of examples, we can prove that
the function η(r) has at most quadratic growth. Thus, the sets Gd(r) are finite for any d ≥ 1 and r ≥ 1.
Proposition 4.5 For all r ≥ 1, the maximal number of vertices η(r) for a (2, 3)-agreeable graph G with
ω(G) ≤ r verifies η(r) ≤ r(r + 3)/2.
Proof. Let G be a (2, 3)-agreeable graph such that ω(G) = r and |V (G)| = η(r). If v is a vertex of G,
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.3 imply the inequalities:
η(r) − r − 1 ≤ deg(v) ≤ η(r − 1).
Solving the recurrence η(r) − r − 1− η(r − 1) ≤ 0 with the initial condition η(1) = 2 gives the result. ✷
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5 Lower bound on Boxicity and the Main Result
Given a simple graph G on n vertices, call a vertex v ∈ V (G) universal if deg(v) = n− 1. The preprint [1]
presents several lower bounds on the boxicity of a graph; we will need the following one.
Theorem 5.1 ([1]) Let G be a graph with no universal vertices and minimum degree δ. Then the boxicity
of G has the lower bound:
box(G) ≥ n
2(n− δ − 1) .
The theorem above only applies to graphs with no universal vertices. Fortunately, the lemma below shows
we only need to consider such graphs. Recall that for all r ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1, the quantity ρ(r, d) denotes the
minimum agreement proportion that can be achieved by a graph G ∈ Gd(r).
Lemma 5.2 Given r ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1, consider a graph G ∈ Gd(r) such that the agreement proportion of G
is equal to ρ(r, d). Then, G has no universal vertices.
Proof. Suppose G ∈ Gd(r) is a graph with universal vertices, G 6= Kn. We construct from G a graph
Ĝ ∈ Gd(r) without universal vertices and with a lower agreement proportion. Let Ω be the set of universal
vertices,
Ω = {v ∈ V (G) | deg(v) = n− 1};
define W = V (G)\Ω and let Ĝ = G[W ] be the graph induced by W . Since we assumed G 6= Kn, the graph
Ĝ is non-empty. Note that box(Ĝ) ≤ box(G) ≤ d, since boxicity can only decrease when considering induced
graphs (Remark 3.2). Letting k = |Ω|, we have for any vertex in w ∈ W ,
deg bG(w) = degG(w) − k < n− 1− k = |W | − 1,
so that no vertex in Ĝ is universal. Moreover, we have
ω(Ĝ) = ω(G)− k,
since any maximal clique in G must contain all the vertices in Ω. Thus, the agreement proportion for Ĝ is
ω(Ĝ)
#V (Ĝ)
=
ω(G)− k
n− k <
ω(G)
n
;
thus, any graph which minimizes agreement proportion does not have any universal vertices. ✷
Our main result, Theorem 1.1, is now easily derived.
Theorem 5.3 For any r ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1, we have
ρ(r, d) ≥ 1
2d
.
In particular, any (2, 3)-agreeable arrangement of d-boxes must have an agreement proportion of at least (2d)−1.
Proof. Consider a graph G ∈ Gd(r) on n vertices such that the agreement proportion of G is equal to the
minimum ρ(r, d). By Lemma 5.2, G does not contain any universal vertex. Theorem 5.1 applies, so that
d ≥ box(G) ≥ n
2(n− δ − 1) ;
where δ denotes the minimum degree in G. Since G is (2, 3)-agreeable, Lemma 4.1 yields
ω(G) ≥ n− δ − 1.
Combining the two inequalities, we get
ρ(r, d) =
ω(G)
n
≥ n− δ − 1
n
≥ 1
2d
.
This completes the proof of the main theorem. ✷
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6 Some Questions
Our research did not yield any general method to construct (2, 3)-agreeable graphs with low agreement
numbers. Achieving this while keeping a handle on boxicity is even more of a challenge, especially given
the hardness of computations. As noted in [1], upper bounds on box(G) have been extensively studied, but
results about lower bounds are scarcer, and any new development in this direction could conceivably impact
this work.
The sharpness of our bounds for d ≥ 2 remains unknown. Answers to the following questions would have
a great impact on the total understanding of the (2, 3)-agreeable case.
Are there examples with high boxicity? Example 3.3 shows that it is easy to find (2, 3)-agreeable
graphs with arbitrarily high boxicity. But the d-partite graph Kd(2) has a high agreement proportion,
1/2. It might be that the twin constraints of (2, 3)-agreeability and low clique number are somehow
at odds with having high boxicity. It might be that the sequence of maximal sizes of (2, 3)-agreeable
graphs with box(G) ≤ d and ω(G) ≤ r,
2r = η(r, 1) ≤ η(r, 2) ≤ η(r, 3) ≤ . . .
becomes eventually constant for d ≥ d0, for a value d0 independent of r. (When r is fixed, we are
dealing with a finite number of graphs, so the boxicity is trivially bounded.) If this sequence indeed
stabilizes, it implies that (2, 3)-agreeable arrangement of boxes have a positive agreement proportion
which is independent of d.
Does the agreement proportion go to zero with d? The lower bound on the agreement proportion of
(2d)−1, obtained in Theorem 1.1, goes to zero when d goes to infinity. But even if the true agreement
proportion is a strictly decreasing function of d, it might still have a positive limit. In that case, we
would again have a positive lower bound valid for all d.
If it were the case, it would imply that η(r) does not grow quadratically, as Proposition 4.5 suggests
it could.
Graph agreement proportion. Another way to ask the same questions is the following: let
ρ(r) = ρ (r, ⌊η(r)/2⌋) .
Since any (2, 3)-agreeable graph has at most η(r) vertices and boxicity as most half its number of
vertices, ρ(r) is the well-defined minimum agreement proportion obtainable from a (2, 3)-agreeable
graph G with ω(G) ≤ r. The problem becomes to understand how ρ(r) varies as a function of r.
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A The Exposed Box Method
During the undergraduate research project when this research was started, in summer 2008, we had originally
obtained a different bound, using another method. The results are comparable for low values of the boxicity,
but Theorem 1.1 always gives a stronger result, and the difference quickly becomes large (see Figure 9). The
method was adapted from the paper [5] by Eckhoff, which deals with maximizing the entries in the face
vector of an arrangement of d-boxes. Since that method is of independent interest, and may be extended in
other contexts, we outline the result and the main steps of the proof in this appendix. (The reader will notice
that Corollary 4.2 is the only required result which is specific to (2, 3)-agreeability. Every tool presented in
the appendix can be extended to the (k,m)-agreeable case.)
Theorem A.1 For any d ≥ 1, there exists γ(d) > 0 such that any (2, 3)-agreeable d-box society of size n
has an overlap of size at least γ(d)n. Moreover, γ(d) ≥ F [d−1](1/2), where F [d−1] denotes the function
F (x) =
−2− x+√4− 4x+ 5x2
2(x− 2) ,
iterated d− 1 times. In particular, for (2, 3)-agreeable boxes in R2, the agreement proportion verifies
γ(2) ≥ 5−
√
13
6
≈ 0.2324.
d 1 2 3 4 5
(2d)−1 0.5 0.25 0.167 0.125 0.1
F [d−1](1/2) 0.5 0.23 0.11 0.05 0.02
Figure 9: A comparison of the results given by Theorem 1.1 and Theorem A.1, for boxicity up to 5.
A.1 The Eckhoff Induction
Let B = {B1, . . . , Bn} denote an arrangement of n boxes in Rd. Recall that if Q ⊆ Rd is a convex subset, a
hyperplane H is said to be a supporting hyperplane for Q if Q ∩H 6= ∅ and Q is entirely contained in one
of the two half-spaces delimited by H . We borrow the following key notion from [5].
Definition A.2 We say that the box Q ∈ B is exposed by the hyperplane H for the arrangement B if
1. H is a supporting hyperplane of Q which is parallel to some coordinate hyperplane.
2. For any P ∈ B such that P ∩H = ∅, P and Q do not lie in the same half-space defined by H.
We call H an exposing hyperplane for Q.
Note that any arrangement of boxes B contains exposed boxes: take any coordinate hyperplane H
infinitely far from B, then bring it back towards the arrangement. The first box which H supports is
exposed by that hyperplane. If B1 is exposed in B by some hyperplane H , we let
B′ = {B2, . . . , Bn} and B′′ = {B1 ∩Bi | 2 ≤ i ≤ n}. (3)
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Figure 10: The Box A is exposed by H . The boxes B and F meet H , and the other three are in the lower
half-plane.
For any arrangement B, we denote by fk(B) the number of non-empty (k + 1)-fold intersections in B. In
particular, f0(B) is the number of boxes in the arrangement and f1(B) is the number of pairwise intersection,
i.e. the number of edges in the intersection graph GB.
Lemma A.3 If B1 is exposed in B, then for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, we have
fk(B) = fk(B′) + fk−1(B′′).
The arrangements B′ and B′′ being also (2, 3)-agreeable, the strategy is to apply Lemma A.3 in the case
k = 1, in order to relate number of vertices and number of edges. Denote by e(n, r, d) the maximal number
of edges for a graph G ∈ Gd(r) with n vertices. We have the following recurrence relation:
Lemma A.4 For all n ≥ r ≥ 2 and all d ≥ 1, we have
e(n, r, d) ≤ e(n− 1, r, d) + η(r − 1, d− 1). (4)
A.2 An Induction on the Number of Boxes
The recurrence on n obtained in Lemma A.4 can be solved to relate the maximum number of edges e(n, r, d)
to the agreement proportion in the previous boxicity, γ(d− 1), and to obtain the following.
Theorem A.5 For all n ≥ r ≥ 2 and all d ≥ 1, we have
e(n, r, d) ≤
(
r
2
)
+ (n− r) r − 1
γ(d− 1) . (5)
A.3 The Quadratic Formula and an Induction on the Boxicity
Theorem A.1 is proved by induction on d. The key is to compare the upper bound (Theorem A.5) and the
lower bound (Corollary 4.2) on the number of edges to narrow down the possible values for ω(G).
A Sketch of the Proof of Theorem A.1. Let G ∈ Gd(r) and let n be the number of vertices of G. The
number of edges of G verifies
n
2
(n− r − 1) ≤ #E(G) ≤
(
r
2
)
+ (n− r) r − 1
γ(d − 1) . (6)
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Let γ = γ(d− 1), and we can rewrite (6) as a quadratic inequality in r with a negative coefficient for r2,
(γ − 2)r2 + (2n+ γn+ 2− γ)r + (−γn2 − 2n+ γn) ≥ 0. (7)
Thus r is greater or equal to the smaller of the two roots of the quadratic expression. Dividing by n and
taking the limit as n goes to infinity, most terms go to zero and we obtain the comparatively simpler
lim
n→∞
r
n
≥ F (γ(d− 1));
with F (x) defined as in Theorem A.1. Thus an induction on d gives an answer in terms of successive
compositions of F . ✷
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